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How the Antitrust Modernization
Commission Should View State Antitrust
Enforcement
By Robert L. Hubbard and James Yoon*
I. Introduction
State antitrust enforcement, long the subject of spirited debate
between its critics' and supporters, 2 is now a topic for study by the
* Robert Hubbard is Director of Litigation and James Yoon is an Assistant
Attorney General in the Antitrust Bureau of the New York Attorney General's
office. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the New York Attorney General or the attorney general of any other state.
1 E.g., Michael DeBow, State Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and
a Modest Reform Proposal, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 267, 280-81
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004) (proposing that reform
measures place an emphasis on the states' role in local markets and provide the
oversight of state enforcers to federal enforcers); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust at
the Millennium (Part II): Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
940 (2001) (noting that states should be stripped of their power to bring antitrust
actions, except in situations where a private firm would also be able to sue);
DeBow, supra note 1, at 280-81 (proposing that states' power to bring parens
patriae suits be abrogated); Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Criminal and
Civil Cartel Victim Compensation: Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System
Promote Sound Competition Policy?, 15 ANTIRUST 41, 45 (2001) (proposing
federal legislation to preempt state indirect purchaser lawsuits).
2 See generally Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust
Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673 (2003) (discussing state enforcers' comparative
advantages); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons From the Laboratories: Cy Pres
Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys
General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361 (1999) (cataloguing efforts by state attorneys
general to prosecute antitrust claims on behalf of their citizens); Harry First,
Pyrrhic Victories? Reexamining the Effectiveness of Antitrust Remedies in
Restoring Competition and Deterring Misconduct: Delivering Remedies: The Role
of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004 (2001)
(quantifying the remedies brought by state attorneys general); Jean Wegman Burns,
Antitrust at the Millennium (Part I): Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust
Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29 (2000)
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Antitrust Modernization Commission (the "Commission" or
"AMC"). The Commission's work, the most recent formal federal
review of the antitrust law, may culminate in recommendations
concerning state antitrust enforcement.
3
This article unabashedly argues that the Commission should
conclude that state antitrust enforcement has benefited consumers;
furthered competition throughout the economy including among
antitrust enforcers; contributed significantly to antitrust
jurisprudence; and helped make our economic system the envy of the
world. Part II discusses how state enforcement has emerged as a topic
for consideration by the Commission. Part Ill defines the role and
sets the context of state antitrust enforcement, emphasizing what state
antitrust enforcers do. Part IV responds to two major themes of the
critics of state antitrust enforcement: first, the political context of the
actions taken by state attorneys general merits praise, not criticism;
second, states have significantly added to antitrust jurisprudence,
both theoretically and practically, as is illustrated by how states have
investigated, litigated, and resolved antitrust matters, large and small.
Finally, this article discusses how state enforcement has enhanced
consumer choice and fostered competition among antitrust enforcers.
II. The Commission and State Antitrust Enforcement
The legislation establishing the Commission does not specify
what topics should be covered and does not mention state
enforcement.4 Yet, the legislation's sponsor, Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner, prominently mentioned state enforcement in his
initial press release about the legislation as one of only three topics
within the antitrust laws that merited study.5 Representative
(discussing the benefits to antitrust jurisprudence of the diversity and innovation
enabled by antitrust federalism).
3 Similar formal federal reviews of the antitrust laws have occurred in 1938-41,
1955, 1967-69, 1977-79, and 1998-2000. Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust
Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 BuFF. L. REv. 1029, 1032-45
(2003).
4 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002), available at
http://amc.gov/pdf/statute/amc-act.pdf.
5 Press Release, Rep. F. James Sesenbrenner, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Sesenbrenner Introduces Antitrust Study
Commission Legislation (June 27, 2001) (on file with the Loyola Consumer Law
Review). This initial press release provided: "Three areas in particular that
Chairman Sensenbrenner would like the commission to address are: 1) the role of
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Sensenbrenner's comments about states at the Commission's first
public meeting were more elaborate. He lengthened his list of topics
and characterized state enforcers as "vital," while worrying about
"divergent and sometimes inconsistent antitrust standards." 6 State
attorneys general recognized that the Commission would likely study
state enforcement, by expressing concern that no one nominated to be
7a Commissioner has state enforcement experience.
As expected, state antitrust enforcement was raised in
response to the Commission's broad-based request for suggested
topics. An antitrust advocacy group, the American Antitrust Institute,
suggested that the Commission probe how state enforcement can be
made more effective. 8 The Cato Institute, a non-profit public policy
research foundation based in Washington, D.C., suggested that state
enforcers be stripped of their parens patriae authority.9 In a letter to
the Commission, Senators Mike DeWine, Chairman, and Herbert
Kohl, Ranking Member, of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
intellectual property law in antitrust law; 2) how antitrust enforcement should
change in the global economy; and 3) the role of state attorneys general in
enforcing antitrust laws." Id.
6 Rep. Sensenbrenner's more elaborate comments on state antitrust
enforcement at the Commission's first public meeting on July 15, 2004 provided:
"[T]he relationship between federal and state antitrust enforcement efforts is
another area of interest. While I believe that states have a vital antitrust
enforcement role, interstate commerce may be adversely affected by divergent, and
sometimes inconsistent antitrust standards." Antitrust Modernization Commission
1, 8 (July 15, 2004), available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/transcript040715.pdf (last visited June 3, 2005).
7 In three separate letters, the officers of the National Association of Attorneys
General ("NAAG") and the leadership of NAAG's Antitrust Committee urged that
people with state enforcement experience be appointed to the Commission. Letter
from Chief State Legal Officers, to George W. Bush, President of the United States
(Aug. 17, 2004); Letter from Chief State Legal Officers, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States (Mar. 4, 2004); Letter from Chief State Legal
Officers, to Senators Tom Daschle & Bill Frist, and Representatives Tom DeLay &
Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 4, 2004) available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/advocacy.html.
8 The American Antitrust Institute, Comments of the American Antitrust
Institute on the Issues to be Included on the Commission's Agenda and
Supplementary Statement of the American Antitrust Institute Concerning
Commission Practice and Procedure to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 6
(Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/aai.pdf.
9 Letter from Mark Moller, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, The Cato
Institute, to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 2-3 (Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/cato.pdf.
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Competition Policy and Consumer Rights stated that "[a]n
examination of the proper role of states in enforcing antitrust law
would be an important topic for study."'
0
The states also submitted comments to the Commission that
included sections on antitrust federalism, remedies, regulated
industries, and merger reviews.l" The most extensive comments were
from the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, which
focused on state enforcement and mentioned state enforcement in the
sections on remedies, merger enforcement, and elsewhere.1
2
In its Initial Slate of Issues Selected for Study, the
Commission responded by asking two questions focused on state
enforcement:
(1) What changes, if any, should be made to the
enforcement role that the states play with respect to federal
antitrust laws?
(2) What role, if any, should private parties and state
attorneys general play in merger enforcement?1
3
On May 9, 2005, the Commission posted "Study Plans,"
including a plan on "Enforcement Institutions."' 14 The enforcement
institutions study plan posed questions for public comment that
elaborated on this state enforcement focus. As to antitrust
'0 Letter from Mike DeWine, Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights & Herb Kohl, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, to Deborah
Garza, Chair, Antitrust Modernization Commission & Jonathan Yarowsky, Vice
Chair, Antitrust Modernization Commission 4 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.amc.gov/conments/senatesubcomm.pdf.
1 American Modernization Commission, Amended Comments of Commission
Issues for Study 1, 2, available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/stateags.pdf (last
visited June 3, 2005).
12 Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association
from Richard J. Wallis, Chair, Section of Antitrust Law 2004-05, to the Antitrust
Modernization Commission (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.amc.gov/conunents/abaantitrustsec.pdf.
13 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Issues Selected for Study, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/study-issues.pdf. (last visited June
3, 2005).
14 Memorandum from the Enforcement Institutions Study Group, to All
(Antitrust Modernization Commission] Commissioners 1 (May 5, 2005), available
at http://amc.gov/pdf/meetings/enforcement-institutionsstudy-plan.pdf.
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enforcement generally, the study plan asked:
1. Some commenters have suggested that dual federal and
state non-merger civil antitrust enforcement should be
limited or eliminated. What evidence, if any, exists
regarding burden, benefits, delay, and/or uncertainty
involved in dual state and federal non-merger civil antitrust
enforcement?
2. To what extent is state parens patriae standing useful or
needed? Please support your response with specific
examples, evidence, and analysis.
3. Should state and federal enforcers divide responsibility
for non-merger civil antitrust enforcement based on
whether the primary locus of alleged harm (or primary
markets affected) is intrastate, interstate, or global? If so,
how should allocation be implemented?
15
As to state merger enforcement, the enforcement institutions
work plan asked:
1. What role should state attorneys general play in merger
enforcement? Please support your response with specific
examples, evidence, and analysis regarding burden,
benefits, delay, and/or uncertainty involved in multiple
state and federal merger reviews.
2. Should merger enforcement be limited to the federal
level, or should other steps be taken to ensure that a single
merger will not be subject to challenge by multiple private
and government enforcers? To what extent has the protocol
for coordination of simultaneous merger investigations
established by the federal enforcement antitrust agencies
and state attorneys general succeeded in addressing issues
of burden, delay, and/or uncertainty associated with
multiple state and federal merger review?' 6
The Commission's work is on-going, with testimony
'5 Id. at 2-3.
16 Id. at2.
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scheduled to begin in late June 2005.
Il. Enforcement Authority of State Antitrust Enforcers
Discussing state antitrust enforcement requires understanding
the themes and context of state antitrust enforcement. Many scholars
and practitioners have written about the activities of state attorneys
general in antitrust matters. 17 Some of that commentary emphasizes
specific actions taken by states.' 8 Yet those details have not quelled,
and indeed may have bolstered, criticism of state antitrust
enforcement.' 9 Understanding the authority of state attorneys general,
how and why that authority is used, and how this authority fits within
antitrust jurisprudence generally focuses on the question of whether
state antitrust enforcement provides value and is worth the costs.
State enforcers are neither federal enforcers nor private counsel,
although what states do often interacts or overlaps with the actions of
federal enforcers or private counsel. Like federal enforcers and
private counsel, state attorneys general act in accord with specific
authority and pursue specific types of antitrust claims.
A. The Antitrust Authority Used By State Attorneys General
In antitrust matters, state attorneys general try to protect the
state, the public interest, and the people in their states. State attorneys
general are the chief legal officers of states and often pursue the
proprietary claims of the state or political subdivisions. That authority
17 See supra notes 2 and 3. Other writings of state enforcement include student
materials within the library of State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law
School, including pieces on the Vitamins Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation
and the Compact Disk Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation. State
Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law School, available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/AGLibrary (last visited June 3,
2005). For people with an historical bent, 482 pages of state antitrust enforcement
materials are collected in State Antitrust Enforcement, XVIII JOURNAL OF REPRINTS
FOR ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS (Fed'l Legal Publications 1988).
18 Patricia A. Conners, Current Trends and Issues in State Antitrust
Enforcement, 16 Loy. CONSUMER. L. REV. 37, 43-50 (2003). See generally ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK (2003)
[hereinafter ABA HANDBOOK] (specifying what state antitrust enforcers have done,
including chapters on multistate investigations and litigation, mergers, criminal
proceedings, health care markets, confidentiality concerns, and settlements).
19 Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by
State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 8-13 (2004).
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includes the right to pursue claims under federal antitrust law because
the state and its subdivisions are "persons" entitled to seek remedies
for antitrust violations.20 States are very large purchasers of goods
and services, and the attorneys general represents the states' interest
as purchasers or other participants in the economy.21 These
proprietary claims have been a significant part of recent multistate
actions such as those in the pharmaceutical industry.22
States, like federal antitrust enforcers, also focus on public
interest issues. Under state law, many state attorneys general can
prosecute antitrust violations as crimes23 and almost all have broad
powers to investigate potential civil claims.24 In addition to the
typical federal antitrust right to injunctive relief under Section 16 of
the Clayton Act,25 state attorneys general can act as parens patriae to
prevent actual or threatened harm to the state's general economy.26
Finally, state attorneys general represent consumers. State
attorneys general pursue damages on behalf of state residents through
parens patriae actions under federal antitrust law.27 This parens
patriae authority for states arises upon filing the action, and does not
20 Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1942) (seeking treble damages);
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 477, 450-51 (1945) (seeking
injunctive relief).
21 E.g., New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d 82, 84-85 (2d Cir.
2000) (alleging bid-rigging of concrete construction work, including for the New
York City Convention Center); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F2d
1065, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1988) (claiming highway construction bid-rigging).
22 E.g., New York v. Aventis, S.A., No. 01-CV-71635 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation) (challenging an agreement under which
branded drug manufacturer paid a generic drug manufacturer to stay off the
market); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., No. 01-CV-11401 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(BuSpar Antitrust Litigation) (challenging an allegedly fraudulent assertion of
patent and other intellectual property rights). The settlements of the litigations cited
in this footnote are available on the settlements portion of the website of the State
Antitrust Enforcement Committee of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, available
at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/settlements.html.
Those settlements define the specifics of the proprietary distributions and are sorted
on the website by the court reviewing the settlement.
23 ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 95-136.
24 Id. at 170 n.1.
25 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West 2005).
26 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 477, 450-51 (1945); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1972).
27 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2004).
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depend on the showing needed to represent a class under Rule 23.28
The states' parens patriae authority lost much of its vitality
and potential when the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,29 although states have continued to pursue claims limited by
Illinois Brick, primarily through supplemental state laws in federal
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry.3 ° In Illinois Brick, the State
of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities sued concrete block
manufacturers, which sold to masonry contractors, which in turn sold
to general contractors from which Illinois purchased the concrete
blocks, claiming that the manufacturers had engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
held that, with certain exceptions, only those who dealt directly with
the price-fixer are injured within the meaning of Section 4 of the
Clayton Act.32 Others within the stream of commerce were labeled
"indirect" purchasers and could not recover. 33 This decision usually
28 Section 4C eliminates the complex determinations that courts must make in
Rule 23 class actions on whether the class is sufficiently numerous, manageable,
and fairly and adequately represented by counsel, by simply authorizing state
attorneys general to represent their citizens as parens patriae. Parens patriae
authority is exercised as soon as the attorney general files the action. In contrast to
Rule 23 practice, the court need not make factual findings before certifying a class.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2004) (no need for court approval or court
findings as to adequacy of representation and the superiority of the means to
adjudicate the claim) with, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (requiring court
approval for class actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring a finding of
superiority of class adjudication); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring findings of
typicality, impracticability of joinder, and fair and adequate representation). Illinois
v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 573 n.29 (1983) (discussing that
Section 4C of the Clayton Act is designed to remedy problems inherent in private
Rule 23 antitrust actions, and exempted parens patriae suits from class action
requirements of Rule 23).
29 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
30 Examples of litigations in which states assert claims under state law, when
federal law under Illinois Brick would not allow such claims, include: Plaintiff
States v. Organon USA Inc., No. 02-CV-2007 (D.N.J. 2002) (Remeron); Ohio v.
Bristol-Myers, Squibb Co., No. 1-01-01080 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2003) (Taxol); New
York v. Aventis, S.A., No. 01-CV-71635 (E.D. Mich.) (Cardizem CD); Alabama v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 01-CV-11401 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (BuSpar). Each of
these settlements are available on the settlements portion of the website of the State
Antitrust Enforcement Committee of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, available
at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/settlements.html.
31 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27.
32 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2004); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 727-31.
33 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735.
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prevents consumers, and state attorneys general acting on their
behalf, from recovering unless they bought directly from the price-
fixer.
34
B. The Context of State Antitrust Enforcement
In addition, the role of state attorneys general in antitrust
matters is not merely the accumulation of the civil authority for state
attorneys general under federal law, or the criminal, investigatory,
and representational authority under state law. State attorneys general
exercise their statutory and common law rights to protect their state's
proprietary interests and their citizens' interests within a federal
system.35 States enjoy additional rights in this system, particularly in
antitrust matters, because state antitrust law is not preempted by
federal antitrust law. 36 Indeed, state antitrust enforcement predates
federal antitrust enforcement; state antitrust statutes are older than the
Sherman Act. 37 Within the substantive area of federal antitrust,
private-including state-enforcement was not an "afterthought; it
was an inte ral part of the congressional plan for protecting
competition."
States are independent decision makers entitled to deference
under our constitutional system and state antitrust law is not
preempted under that federal system. State attorneys general have the
power and indeed obligation, to make independent decisions,
including decisions that may diverge from the decisions made by
34 E.g., Kansas v. Utilicorp. United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207-19 (1990)
(rejecting various ways around the "direct" purchaser rule of Illinois Brick).
35 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02 (1982).
36 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97-102 (1989).
37 See David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141
(1990) (at least twelve states had antitrust legislation prior to the United States
Congress passing the Sherman Act in 1890); Stanley Mosk, State Antitrust
Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 358, 363 (1962) (twenty-one states had "constitutional or statutory"
antitrust laws in 1890).
38 California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990). See generally Jay L.
Himes, Exploring the Antitrust Operating System: State Enforcement of Federal
Antitrust Law in the Remedies Phase of the Microsoft Case, 11 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 37, 60-67 (2002) (discussing the authority underlying some states' decision to
seek remedies against Microsoft after the United States Department of Justice and
other states had settled).
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federal enforcers. 39 As phrased by one of the founding fathers of
modem state antitrust enforcement: "Federalism is not a suicide
pact. ' 4 0 Antitrust federalism means that the market for antitrust
enforcement, like the markets to which antitrust laws apply, is ruled
by competition, and that competition among antitrust enforcers and
bodies of law fosters alternatives, choice, innovation, and insight.4'
The independent decision-making of state attorneys general in
antitrust matters is most clearly illustrated in the area of vertical
restraints. Since the 1980s, states have focused on vertical restraints,
primarily resale price maintenance, and provided remedies on behalf
42of consumers through parens patriae actions. Vertical agreements
are among businesses at different levels of distribution such as among
a manufacturer, wholesalers, and retailers. Vertical restraints include
resale price maintenance, exclusive dealings, and tying arrangements.
Horizontal agreements are among entities at the same level of
distribution. Horizontal restraints include agreements among
competitors to set the price at which the product will be sold or to
allocate territories or customers.43 States have been more active in
pursuing vertical restraint cases than the federal enforcers.4a
39 See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002)
(upholding the right of a group of states to pursue additional remedies after the
United States and a different group of states settled).
40 Lloyd Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 184
(Winter 1990).
41 See Kevin J. O'Connor, Federalist Lessons for International Antitrust
Convergence, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 419-29 (2002) (discussing concurrent
enforcement of antitrust law in the United States); Bums, supra note 2, at 30
(noting that "[s]uch diversity and experimentation are especially important in a
field like antitrust, where debate continues on how best to approach certain key
issues and the laws' proper goals").
42 Conners, supra note 18, at 53-54.
43 H. Hovenkamp, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 8.1, 9.1
(1985).
44 E.g., In re Compact Disk Minimum Advertised Price Litigation, MDL 1361
(D. Me. 2003) (challenging music distribution imposition of minimum advertised
price policies); New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(alleging resale price maintenance and anticompetitive exclusive dealings); In re
Toys "R" Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (alleging group
boycott); New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (alleging resale
price maintenance); New York v. Keds Corp., 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,549
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (alleging resale price maintenance); Maryland v. Mitsubishi
Electronics America Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,743 (D. Md. 1992)
(alleging resale price maintenance); In re Panasonic Consumer Electronics
506 [Vol. 17:4
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C. States' Experience with Securing Remedies Such As
Consumer Recovery
Making independent decisions in matters concerning vertical
restraints and otherwise, state antitrust enforcers have been
instrumental in recovering millions of dollars in cash or other value
for injured consumers in checks, coupons, products, or a combination
of these.45 In addition to stopping the anticompetitive activities, states
seek to ensure that consumers harmed by antitrust violations receive
compensation.46 States have often provided direct monetary to
individual consumers that the states allege were injured by the
antitrust violation.47 In some instances, identifying the individual
purchasers may be difficult or impossible, or the average individual
recovery may be too small relative to the cost of administering each
claim. In that circumstances, states have distributed settlement
proceeds cy pres; where states have delivered settlement funds are
not delivered directly to consumers, but instead to programs designed
to benefit the consumers harmed by the restraint, such as to non-
profit organizations or charities that can provide programs that
benefit individuals. 49
Products Antitrust Litigation, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 68,613 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(alleging resale price maintenance). Businesses went to the States complaining
about vertical restraints only after efforts to interest federal enforcers failed. Alan
Malasky, Commentary: Antitrust Federalism, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 185, 185-87
(Winter 1990).
45 Conners, supra note 18, at 37 (mentioning recovery of nearly $400 million
on behalf of consumers and public entities in 2002).
46 Id. at 59-60.
47 States have delivered checks to consumers as part of the settlement of resale
price maintenance litigations. E.g., In re Compact Disk Minimum Advertised Price
Litigation, MDL 1361 (D. Me. 2003) (awarding cash payments directly to
individual consumers); Maryland v. Mitsubishi Electronics America Inc., 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17395, at *1-2 (D. Md. 1992) (awarding cash payment directly to
individual consumers); In re Panasonic Consumer Electronics Products Antitrust
Litigation, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6274, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (awarding cash
payments directly to individual consumers). See generally ABA HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 211-21. Each of the settlements approved in the decisions cited in this
footnote are available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/settlements.html. Those settlements define the specifics of the consumer
distribution and are sorted on the website by the court reviewing the settlement.
48 New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
49 States have used cy pres distributions in their settlements of resale price
maintenance and other vertical restraints claims. E.g., New York v. Salton, Inc.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (distributing to health and nutrition
2005]
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Two recent multistate cases led by New York illustrate these
different methods of distributing value to consumers. In New York v.
Feldman, New York, Maryland, and California delivered checks
directly to individuals impacted or who might have been impacted by
the scheme. 50 Feldman challenged a bid-rigging scheme at public
stamp auctions in which the defendants conferred prior to the public
auctions, agreed to not compete at the public auction, and divided the
"savings" from the agreement among themselves. The states alleged
that the defendants' conduct deprived sellers, auction houses, and
others of the benefits of a competitive marketplace, in violation of
federal and state antitrust laws. In Feldman, the states delivered to
individual consumers the specific amounts that the states estimated
the individuals were damaged based on records of the bid-rigging
conspiracy.52 The states also delivered checks to individuals who
purchased stamps from the defendants during the time of the
conspiracy for which records of the bid rigging conspiracy from
which to estimate specific impacts were not available.53
In contrast, in New York v. Salton, Inc. forty-nine states and
other jurisdictions recovered $7.7 million as a monetary settlement
and distributed those funds cy pres.54 The states' claim was that
Salton had coerced its retailers who were discounting Salton's very
popular indoor contact grill product to increase their prices in
conformity to Salton's resale pricing policy. 55 Instead of distributing
this money to specific individuals, the states distributed the funds cy
related organizations); In re Toys "R" Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (distributing toys to charitable organizations); New York v.
Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (distributing to benefit athletic
facilities, equipment, or services); New York v. Keds Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3362, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distributing to charitable causes benefiting
women ages 15 to 44). Each of the settlements approved in the decisions cited in
this footnote are available on the settlements portion of the website of the State
Enforcement Committee of the ABA Antitrust Section, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/settlements.html. Those
settlements define the specifics of the cy pres distribution and are sorted on the
website by the court reviewing the settlement. See generally ABA HANDBOOK,
supra note 18, at 215-18.
50 New York v. Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
5' Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
52 Order, New York v. Feldman, No. 01 Civ. 6691 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2004).
53 id.
54 New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
55 Salton, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
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pres because identifying individual purchasers was difficult and the
cost of identifying and delivering money to individuals cost more
than the amount that each individual consumer would receive. 56 To
insure that these funds would be used for the benefit of the class of
purchasers covered by the settlement, the states provided the funds to
organizations promoting health and nutrition-related causes.57
IV. Responding to the Critics of State Antitrust
Enforcement
Perhaps due to a lack of understanding-or a lack of
publicity-state antitrust enforcement has its critics. States are
criticized as (1) making "political," not enforcement, decisions; (2)
not adding to the development of antitrust theories and doctrine; and
(3) acting as free riders on the efforts of federal enforcers. 58
A. State Attorneys General Are Politicians
The first theme of the critics of state antitrust enforcement is
that state attorneys general are subject to "political incentives" that
have "a potential to generate socially perverse consequences." 59 The
argument basically is that state politicians have an incentive to
engage in antitrust litigation that is "protectionism" designed to
56 1d. at 314.
57 Order, New York v. Salton, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7096 (S.D.N.Y. May 10,
2004).
58 See generally Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 252
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) [hereinafter Federalism and
State A.G.s] (discussing federalism and not finding support for states bringing
parens patriae actions under federal law). A very similar version of the argument is
published in Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 5 (2004) (criticizing the
states' use of parens patraie power in bringing antitrust actions). Both versions are
based on Richard Posner, Is Federalism Overrated?, Address Before the American
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, (Apr. 21, 2003) available at
http://www.federalismproject.org/masterpages/AntitrustlPosner.pdf. A state
enforcer responded to that critique: Jay L. Himes, Federal "Unemption" of State
Antitrust Enforcement, 9-14, Remarks for Antitrust, Competition and Trade
Committee of LEX MUNDI (May 14, 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/unemption.pdf.
59 Federalism and State A.G.s, supra note 58, at 258.
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"advance their political agenda." 60 The argument, which appears to
be based on a distaste for elected officials, concludes with an
"independently desirable ... reform" that the state attorneys general
be "appointed rather than elected.",
6
'
This argument is both inaccurate and overstated. Only forty-
three state attorneys general are elected; five are appointed by the
governor; Maine's Attorney General is selected by secret ballot of the
legislature; Tennessee's is selected by the state supreme court.
62
Perhaps the means of selecting an attorney general merits study as
illustrated by Maine's comparatively robust record of antitrust
enforcement.6 3 Yet, despite that caveat, the record is clear that states
pursue antitrust matters in an overwhelmingly consistent manner
through the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force, protocols,
guidelines, resolutions, and otherwise.
64
Moreover, the argument falsely assumes that federal enforcers
are never influenced by political considerations. Yet, federal
enforcers are frequently influenced by politics. Federal enforcers are
nominated and confirmed by politicians and consider it prudent to
respond to the inquiries of politicians. 65 Federal enforcement,
6 Id.
61 Federalism and State A.G.s, supra note 58, at 260.
62 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 15-19 (Lynne
Ross, ed., BNA Books 1990) [hereinafter STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL]; Jason
Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General
in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998, 2002 (2001).
63 A list of the formal antitrust actions taken by Maine is available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/maineantitrustactions.pdf.
64 The documents underlying these coordinated state practices are available on
the website of the American Bar Association, State Antitrust Enforcement
Committee, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-
antitrust/statepractices.html (last visited June 3, 2005).
65 One particularly prominent recent manifestation of the influence of politics
on federal antitrust enforcers concerns the nomination of Deborah P. Majoras as
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Ms. Majoras was nominated by
President Bush on May 11, 2004. Muris Will Leave Commission; Bush Taps
Majoras to Lead FTC, 86 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 512 (May 14,
2004). A May 2004 report from the General Accounting Office found that
petroleum industry mergers caused prices to rise, which the FTC-the agency that
reviewed those mergers for potential anticompetitive effects--disputed. FTC Touts
Gasoline Industry Experience, Challenges GAO Report's Determinations, 87
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 32 (July 9, 2004). Dissatisfied with her
response to questions about FTC policies toward the petroleum industry and
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however, is funded by politicians. 66 Indeed, the Tunney Act, which
requires court approval of the antitrust consent decrees negotiated by
the United States Department of Justice, was passed by Congress
precisely because federal enforcers allegedly had been improperly
influenced by politics.
67
But more fundamentally, in our adversarial system a lawyer is
supposed to protect zealously the interests that he or she represents,
even when that representation is "protectionism." 68 As phrased under
New York law, "the attorney general shall ... protect the interests of
the state.' 69 This right to "protect" the interests of the state and her
citizens under the federal antitrust laws is well-established. For
example, in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,7° the harmful effects of
the alleged price-fixing conspiracy on state interests were:
(a) to deny to many of Georgia's products equal access
gasoline pricing, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon placed a hold on Ms. Majoras's
nomination, to which President Bush responded with a recess appointment. Bush
Appoints Two New Commissioners, Will Designate Majoras as FTC Chairman, 87
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 136 (Aug. 6, 2004). Prior to Ms. Majoras's
second confirmation hearing, Senator Wyden withdrew his hold after receiving a
letter from Ms. Majoras promising to "get to the bottom" of the differences
between the FTC and GAO. Wyden Lifts Hold on FTC Nomination; Senate
Confirms Majoras and Leibowitz, 87 in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
545 (Nov. 26, 2004).
66 Politicians may seek to influence enforcement through funding or the
withholding of funding. Haoran Lu, "Presidential Influence on Independent
Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels," 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 51, 51,
61-64 (1998); see Robert Abrams, Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, 29
WASHBURN L.J. 350, 351 (1990) (noting that the fifty percent staff cuts at the
federal antitrust enforcement agencies in the 1980s limit federal enforcement
possibilities); Robert Abrams & Lloyd Constantine, Dual Antitrust Enforcement in
the 1990s, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 484, 501 (Harry First et al. eds. 1991)
(stating that federal enforcement depends in part on federal funding).
67 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h); see Hearings on S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1973) (quoted in 5 Julian 0. von Kalinowski, ANTITRUST LAW & TRADE
REGULATION § 96.03[1] (2d ed. Matthew Bender 2005)) (The Act was passed "to
bring the consent decree process into the full light of day [and to] ensure that the
courtroom rather than the back room becomes the final arbiter in antitrust
enforcement.").
68 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63.1 (Consol. 2004) (emphasis added).
70 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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with those of other States to the national market;
(b) to limit in a general way the Georgia economy to staple
agricultural products, to restrict and curtail opportunity in
manufacturing, shipping and commerce, and to prevent the
full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the
State;
(c) to frustrate and counteract the measures taken by the
State to promote a well-rounded agricultural program,
encourage manufacture and shipping, provide full
employment, and promote the general progress and welfare
of its people; and
(d) to hold the Georgia economy in a state of arrested
development.7
The Court permitted the attorney general to defend precisely
those interests, including interests that might be labeled
"protectionist," such as state measures to promote "a well-rounded
agricultural program." The Supreme Court decided as a matter of
federal antitrust law:
[W]e find no indication that, when Congress fashioned
those civil remedies, it restricted the States to suits to
protect their proprietary interests. Suits by a State, parens
patriae, have long been recognized. There is no apparent
reason why those suits should be excluded from the
purview of the anti-trust acts.7 2
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., the Court repeated the holding
that state attorneys general can act as parens patriae to prevent actual
or threatened harm to the state's general economy under the federal
antitrust laws.73
The obligation of state attorneys general to protect the
interests of the state and its citizens is not limited to competitive
concerns or antitrust claims. An attorney general has obligations in a
wide variety of substantive areas, such as consumer and
71 Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. at 444.
72 Id. at 447.
73 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260, 266 (1972).
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environmental protection, civil rights, charities, etc.74 The Supreme
Court has extended this range by recognizing the legitimacy and right
of state attorneys general to act on behalf of their state's citizens
generally in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, holding that
"a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well being-
both physical and economic--of its residents in general." 
7 5
Considering these broader interests is part of a state attorney
general's 7job, including when competitive concerns are being
analyzed.
Moreover, the argument that attorneys general act politically
has a substantive antitrust component as well most clearly in merger
review. Most of the criticism in the merger context is that states
worry too much about jobs, and not enough about the competitive
process.77 Yet, preserving the competitive process requires preserving
separate competitors, and jobs are part of preserving that separate
decision maker.
In addition, the criticism overlooks how antitrust enforcement
is structured. State attorneys general have the responsibility to
investigate competitive concerns and the right to assert antitrust
claims. Judges, not plaintiffs or plaintiff-politicians, decide whether
an antitrust claim exists and whether an antitrust remedy is
appropriate. 79 That structure is a significant check on the "potential"
74 See generally STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 62. This book has
thirty chapters, most of which focus on specific substantive areas for which the
attorneys general have responsibilities: Chapter 10 is Environment; Chapter 14 is
Civil Rights Enforcement; Chapter 15 is Charitable Trusts and Solicitations;
Consumer Protection is Chapter 18; Antitrust is Chapter 20. Id. A state attorney
general's wide range of rights and responsibilities is also illustrated on the website
of the National Association of Attorneys General, http://www.naag.org/, which lists
various NAAG projects in a variety of substantive areas.
75 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
76 One illustration of the impact of other issues on competitive concerns is in
health care markets. In those matters, the attorney general's relationship with state
agencies, such as the departments of health and insurance, coupled with obligations
to protect charitable assets, impact the analysis. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at
142-46.
77 E.g., DeBow, supra note 1, at 275-77.
78 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257-59 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding that the loss of an independent competitor is antitrust injury).
79 Richard Wolfram & Spencer Weber Waller, Contemporary Antitrust
Federalism: Cluster Bombs or Rough Justice? in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK
STATE 2, 42 (eds. Robert Hubbard & Pamela Jones Harbour, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
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of enforcers who are "politicians" to abuse their right to assert
antitrust claims. 80
Finally, state attorneys general-like all politicians and
elected officials-deserve respect for bringing a unique perspective
to antitrust issues. 81 Indeed, the founding fathers probably viewed the
perspective of elected officials to be "their greatest source of wisdom,
power, and legitimacy." 82 Courts have repeatedly recognized the
superiority of government actions in a variety of contexts.83
Congress has expressly endorsed and expanded the authority
and legitimacy in antitrust matters of state attorneys general, as the
chief law enforcement officials of their states in antitrust matters. 84
When enacting Section 4C of the Clayton Act, Congress built upon
the common law parens patriae powers of a state attorney general to
create a representative for consumers superior to a Rule 23 class
representative:
H.R. 8532 employs an ancient concept of our basic English
common law-the power of the sovereign to sue as parens
2002) ("[M]any antitrust cases are the kind where reasonable people can differ,
and.., we rely on the judiciary, and not on executive fiat at either the state or
federal level, to set our fundamental competition policy.").
80 See O'Connor, supra note 41, at 423-29 (discussing how case law constrains
the decisions made by different enforcers).
81 Eliot Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism Revisited, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N
2003 ANTITRUST LAW SECTION SYMPOSIUM 29-33 (2003) (discussing federalism in
the context of antitrust and other areas of state and federal enforcement, such as
environmental protection and civil rights); O'Connor, supra note 41, at 419-29
(discussing how antitrust federalism in the United States prevents under-
enforcement, generates case law, and minimizes "false negative" enforcement
decisions); Robert Abrams, Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, 29 WASHBURN L.J.
350, 351-52 (1990) (advocating cooperative and complementary antitrust
enforcement by state and federal authorities).
82 Abrams & Constantine, supra note 66, at 499.
83 See Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210-13 (9th Cir. 1975)
(involving false and misleading advertising and deceptive sales practices); United
States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 243 (N.D. 11. 1976) (regarding civil
rights claims), aff'd and rev'd in part on other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.
1977); Stuart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73, 77-78 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
(analyzing sex discrimination claims); Wechsler v. Southeastern Properties, Inc., 63
F.R.D. 13, 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (concerning securities claims), affd, 506 F.2d
631, 636 (2d Cir. 1974).
84 H.R. Rep. No. 94-499(I), at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2575
(discussing how the state attorney general's primary duty is to protect the health
and welfare of the state's citizens).
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patriae on behalf of the weak and helpless of the realm-to
solve a very modem problem in antitrust enforcement. This
doctrine is also firmly embedded in American
jurisprudence. Since 1900 the Federal courts have
expanded the power of a State to sue "'in her capacity as a
quasi-sovereign or as agent and protector of her people
against a continuing wrong done to them."
85
A state attorney general is an effective and ideal spokesman
for the public in antitrust cases, because a primary duty of the State is
to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. He is normally an
elected and accountable and responsible public officer whose duty is
86to promote the public interest.
Implementing that endorsement of state attorneys general,
Congress relieved them of the obligation to comply with class action
procedures and statutorily established them as the best representatives
for consumers in their respective states. As Representative Peter
Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and one of the
principal sponsors of the 4C legislation, explained:
[T]he compromise bill does not incorporate the various
requirements of rule 23(b)(3): That the claims be "typical";
that common issues "predominate" over individual ones;
that the action be "manageable" within the meaning of rule
23-for this bill represents the legislative conclusion that
the State's attorney general is the best representative
conceivable for the State's consumers-as the courts have
repeatedly recognized.87
Since passage of Section 4C, courts have rejected attempts by
private class action parties to supersede parens patriae authority
asserted by state attorneys general. °°
85 Id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2578 (citing Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 443 (1945)).
86 Id. at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2575.
87 122 Cong. Rec. 30,879 (1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 94-499(I), at 6-8,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576-78.
88 Pennsylvania v. Budget Fuel Co. Inc., 122 F.R.D. 184, 185-86 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (class certification allegations stricken because parens patriae authority
asserted by the Pennsylvania attorney general is superior representation); In re
Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16556, at
*4-5 (D. Md. July, 17, 1978) (settlement approval denied without attorney general
participation as parens patriae).
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B. States' Claims Add to Antitrust Jurisprudence
The next criticism is that states do not add to the antitrust
jurisprudence. In the words of Judge Posner:
Because of resource constraints that I have mentioned, it is
unlikely that state attorneys general will be sources of
innovative antitrust doctrines or methods of proof-and in
fact, I know of no examples where they have been.
89
But a simple recitation of leading United States Supreme
Court cases brought by state attorneys general belies the assertion
that state attorneys general are not sources of innovative antitrust
doctrines or methods of proof. In California v. ARC America Corp.,
the Court unanimously held that claims under state antitrust law, even
when inconsistent with claims under federal antitrust law, can be
secured in federal court litigation.90 In ARC America, four states sued
in federal court on behalf of themselves and all governmental entities
within their respective states as "downstream" or "indirect"
purchasers of cement and concrete used in state projects. 9' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that,
although state antitrust laws permitted recovery for these purchasers,
these state antitrust laws were preempted by contrary federal antitrust
92laws.
On writ of certiorari, the issue before the Supreme Court in
ARC America was whether Illinois Brick, which usually prevents
"indirect" purchasers from recovering damages, also prevents
recovery under state statutes. 93 The Court considered a California
statute that declared that California law was different than federal
law, a Minnesota statute that rejected the Illinois Brick prospectively,
an Alabama statute that since 1907 had permitted "indirect" damages,
and an Arizona statute that used language similar to the federal
statute but which had not been construed by Arizona state courts. The
Court found no preemption by Congress of any of these state antitrust
89 Federalism and State A. G.s, supra note 58, at 258.
90 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989).
91 The four litigating states were Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota.
ARC Am Corp., 490 U.S. at 97.
92 In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F. 2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir.
1987).
93 Id. at 100.
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laws. 94 The Court held that state indirect purchaser statutes were not
preempted and that Congress intended federal antitrust laws to
supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies. 95 ARC America's
endorsement of state antitrust law has allowed the development of a
whole new area of practice, including recent state litigation in the
pharmaceutical industry.
96
Similarly seminal is Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,9 7 in which the State of Arizona sought review of a judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
denied the state's motion for summary judgment against defendant
medical societies.98 Arizona sued the defendant medical societies for
price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.99 Arizona
alleged that agreements among competing physicians to set
maximum fees for health services that they rendered to insured
patients were a per se illegal price-fixing conspiracy. 100 The medical
societies argued that the per se rule was inapplicable because the
agreements were among doctors and that the judiciary had little
antitrust experience in the health care industry.101 The Supreme Court
held that the per se rule was as applicable to the medical profession
as to any other provider of goods or services; the Sherman Act
establishes one uniform rule for price-fixing agreements applicable to
all industries alike. 1
02
California v. American Stores Co., 103 another very important
Supreme Court decision, involved state enforcement in a merger
case. In American Stores, the Court held that divestiture is a form of
injunctive relief within the meaning Section 16 of the Clayton Act. 104
The State of California sued to enjoin American Stores from merging
with a competitor to double its share of supermarkets in California
94 Id. at 100-02.
9 Id. at 102.
96 See supra note 31.
9' 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
98 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1980).
99Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
'
00 Maricopa County Med Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 336.
10' Id. at 342.
102 Id. at 348-55.
103 California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
'04 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West 2005); Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 296.
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after the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") gave its final approval
to the merger. 10 5 California sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
the integration of the two merging companies and a divestiture of all
the acquired stores located in California, which the district court
granted. 1 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set
aside the injunction granted by the district court reasoning that
divestiture is not a remedy available in private actions under Section
16 of the Clayton Act. 10 7 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, concluding that the plain text of Section 16 authorizes
divestiture decrees as a form of injunctive relief to remedy Section 7
violations in private actions. 1
08
Moreover, the innovations in antitrust doctrine spurred by
state attorneys general extend internationally. In Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, nineteen states sued domestic and
foreign insurers for allegedly conspiring to restrict the terms of
coverage of commercial general liability insurance in the United
States. °9 In the leading case on the reach of the antitrust laws beyond
the United States, the Court concluded that the Sherman Act applies
to "foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States. '10
These important state enforcement actions clearly
demonstrate that states contribute to antitrust jurisprudence.
Furthermore, even New York acting alone has fostered innovative
antitrust doctrines and methods of proof.1" In New York v. Julius
Nasso Concrete Corp. ,112 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the issues of causation, estimating
damages, and establishing collateral estoppel.' 13 New York alleged a
105 Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 275-76.
106 California v. Am. Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1135-36 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
107 California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1989).
108 Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 282, 296.
109 Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993).
110 Harford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 796.
111 New York v. St. Francis Hospital, 94 F. Supp. 399, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(granting summary judgment on liability for plaintiff on price-fixing and market
allocation claims against two competing hospitals). Of course, other district court
cases in litigations brought by other states not discussed here have also contributed
significantly to furthering antitrust jurisprudence.
112 New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
113 Id. at 86-89.
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bid-rigging conspiracy in the construction business by organized
crime.' 4 The United States prosecuted the conspiracy criminally, as a
RICO violation. 115 New York appealed the decision of the district
court, which rejected the State's proof on damages." 6 Defendants
cross-appealed the district court's granting of summary judgment for
New York on the issue of antitrust liability based on the collateral
effect of the prior criminal RICO conviction.11 7
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling on
collateral estoppel for antitrust liability and vacated the trial court's
finding of no damages." 8 The court found that in an antitrust case
where all the sellers were members of the conspiracy, the district
court has discretion to conclude that the finding of antitrust activity
and the purchasing of services from the convicted defendants without
more may prove causation.1" 9 As to the issue of antitrust damages,
the court recognized that New York's burden of proving antitrust
damages is not as rigorous because of the lack of market information
that is unaffected by the bid-rigging activity. 120 In such a case, the
plaintiff need only provide some relevant data from which the court
can make a reasonable estimated calculation of the harm suffered so
that the finder of fact can make a just and reasonable inference of
damages. 1
2 1
Similarly, in The Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Department
Stores, New York teamed with a regional department store chain and
sued to enjoin the acquisition of a local department store chain by a
national department store because it would diminish competition in
the Rochester, New York area. 122 The dispute over the definition of
the relevant product market was crucial to the case. 23 The plaintiffs
argued the relevant product market to be "traditional department
14 Id. at 84-85.
115 Id.
16 Id. at 86.
"7 Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d at 86.
118 Id. at 84.
"9 Id. at 86.
I20Id. at 88.
121 Id. at 89.
122 The Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 862
(W.D.N.Y. 1994).
123 Id. at 865.
5192005]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
stores" but the defendants argued the relevant product market to be
all stores selling general merchandise, apparel and furniture.' 24 The
district court determined, after reviewing the evidence and taking
actual market realities into consideration, that the "traditional
department store" constitutes a proper sub-market of a larger retail
market. 125 The court enjoined the department store acquisition
because it would harm consumers by raising prices for merchandise
and reduce competition by excluding a competitor from the
Rochester market. 126
C. States Both Lead and Initiate Antitrust Litigation
Contrary to being free riders, states are often the first and only
plaintiff in antitrust matters. Acting alone, states have initiated
matters or extended matters into new areas or for new claimants. The
cases cited in the footnote illustrates these points for all fifty states. 127
124 Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 865.
125 Id. at 875.
126/d. at 877-79.
127 The following cases are illustrative of states' initiatives in antitrust matters:
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir.
1978) (Alabama and local educational authorities sued manufacturers
and distributors of school bus bodies, claiming defendants conspired to
fix prices and restrain trade);
Alaska v. Chevron Chem. Co., 669 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Alaska sued manufacturers of agricultural fertilizer for fixing prices
and allocating markets);
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1982)
(Arizona sued medical societies for price-fixing through agreements
among competing member physicians who agreed to set the fee
amounts they could collect for their services);
Arkansas v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., Co., 128 S.W. 555, 55-
56 (Ark. 1910) (Arkansas sued a railroad corporation for fixing the
rates to be charged for freight and passenger service);
California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1990) (California
sued for an injunction after the fourth largest grocery chain acquired all
of the outstanding stock of the largest grocery chain in California,
alleging the merger constituted an anti-competitive acquisition);
Colorado v. Goodell Bros., Inc., Civ. A No. 84-A-803, 1987, at *1 (D.
Colo. July 7, 1987) (Colorado sued contractors alleging a conspiracy to
restrain trade in the highway construction industry by bid-rigging on
various highway construction projects);
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Connecticut v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., No. Cv-99-589962 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 3, 1999) (Connecticut sued to prohibit acquisition of
major competing ambulance service providers in Connecticut);
Delaware v. Mid-Atlantic Paving Co., C.A. No. 7197, 1983 WL 14930,
at *1 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1983) (Delaware sued a construction company
for price-fixing the sale of liquid asphalt);
District of Columbia v. CVS Corp., Civ. No. 03-4431 (D.C. Sup. Ct.
May 30, 2003) (District of Columbia sued to challenge the acquisition
of a pharmacy);
Florida v. Abbott Labs., 1993-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) 70,241 (N.D. Fla.
1993) (Florida sued and settled with infant formula manufacturers for a
conspiracy among competitors regarding pricing and marketing of
infant formula products);
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1945) (Georgia
sued defendant railroads for conspiring to fix rates charged for
transportation of freight);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 253 (1972)
(Hawaii sued defendants for conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce
in the sale, marketing, and distribution of refined petroleum products
and for monopolization of the market);
Idaho v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 106 P.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Sup. Ct.
May 30, 2003) (Idaho sued chemical manufacturers for an illegal
conspiracy to fix prices in the commercial sorbates industry);
Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Illinois sued construction companies for engaging in a conspiracy to
allocate highway construction projects put out for public bids);
Indiana v. The Home Brewing Co. of Indianapolis, 105 N.E. 909, 910 (
Ind. 1914) (Indiana sued a corporation for monopolizing the business
of selling beer and other intoxicating liquors);
Iowa v. Scott & Fetzer Co., Civil No. 81-362-E, 1982 WL 1874, at *1
(S.D. Iowa July 8, 1982) (Iowa sued defendants for antitrust violations,
in a case testing the state attorney general's ability to sue under the
parens patriae provision of the Clayton Act);
Kansas v. Am. Oil Co., 446 P.2d 754, 755 (Kan. 1968) (Kansas sued
corporations engaged in the supply of liquid asphalt for bid-rigging
asphalt sales and allocating sales territory);
Kentucky v. Plainview Farms Dev. Corp., No. 234010, 1977 WL
18405 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 1977) (Kentucky sued a real estate
developer for an unlawful tying arrangement which conditioned the
purchase of a residential condominium or unit upon the purchase of use
of a recreational facility);
Louisiana v. Seifert, 524 So. 2d 160, 161 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(Louisiana sued three defendants for monopolization and attempted
522 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 17:4
monopolization of the film industry);
Maine v. Connors Bros. Ltd., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,937 (Me.
Super. Ct. 2000) (Maine, in a consent agreement, permitted a Canadian
sardine processing company to a acquire the assets of a Maine-based
competitor);
Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 620 F. Supp. 907, 909
(D. Md. 1985) (Maryland sued health insurers for price fixing and
allocating markets, customers, and contracts by submitting non-
competitive and collusive bids);
Massachusetts v. William Bayley, Ltd., 1983 WL 14914, (Mass. Super.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1983) (Massachusetts sued defendant for exclusive dealing
by requiring bid specifications for public construction and renovation
projects specify exclusive use of the products of a certain manufacturer
of security windows);
Michigan v. McDonald Dairy Co., 905 F. Supp. 447, 450 (W.D. Mich.
1995) (Michigan sued dairy companies on behalf of public schools for
bid-rigging on contracts to supply milk to area school districts);
Minnesota v. Nat'l Beauty Supply Co., No. 736778, 1977 WL 18389
(D. Minn. June 9, 1977) (Minnesota sued five beauty supply
wholesalers for price-fixing and eliminating discounts from wholesale
prices of beauty supplies);
Mississippi v. Jackson Cotton Oil Co., 48 So. 300, 300 (Miss. 1909)
(Mississippi sued two competing cotton seed oil manufacturers for a
price-fixing conspiracy to limit the price of a commodity);
Missouri v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., No. CV195-393-CC,
1995 WL 788087 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1995) (Missouri sued a group
of physicians who operated a medical clinic-partnership for conspiracy
and attempted monopolization for the sale of prescription drugs and
durable medical equipment to patients, nursing homes and residential
care facilities);
Montana v. SuperAmerica, 559 F. Supp. 298, 299-300 (D. Mont. 1983)
(Montana sued an oil company for a conspiring with its competitors to
fix prices for gasoline);
Nebraska v. Associated Grocers, 332 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Neb. 1983)
(Nebraska sued dairy product wholesalers, a retail grocer and
individuals for price-fixing the sale of milk);
Nevada v. Merkley & Hankins, Inc., No. 20644, 1988 WL 247972 (D.
Nev. July 6, 1988) (Nevada sued a gasoline and petroleum product
wholesaler for fixing the resale prices of gasoline);
New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Grocers Ass'n, Inc., 348 A.2d 360,
360-61 (N.H. 1975) (New Hampshire sued a retail grocers association
for attempts to coerce manufacturers and distributors to refrain from
offering fresh baked goods to discount bakery stores);
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New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94, 95 (3d Cir. 1967) (New
Jersey filed suit in district court against seven corporations, seeking
treble damages for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act);
New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co., Civil No. 81-054-JB. 1981 WL
2167 (D. N.M. Dec. 22, 1981) (New Mexico sued defendants for
antitrust violations, in a case testing the state attorneys general ability
to sue under the parens patriae provision of the Clayton Act);
New York v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (New York sued two New York hospitals for engaging in illegal
price-fixing and market allocation through joint negotiations);
North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 276 (4th Cir.
1984) (North Carolina sued the owner of psychiatric facilities alleging
that acquisition of particular facility violated the antitrust laws);
Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1248-49 (S.D.
Ohio 1996) (Ohio sued several dairies, alleging conspiracy to set prices
and allocate territories in sale of milk to school districts);
Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corp., 312 F. Supp. 130, 131 (W.D.
Okla. 1968) (Oklahoma sued corporations for conspiring to rig bids for
liquid asphalt sales);
Oregon v. Fields & Endsley, Inc., No. 151873, 1984 WL 15669 (Or.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 4, 1984) (Oregon sued defendants for price-fixing
wholesale and retail gasoline);
Pennsylvania v. Providence Health Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:CV-94-
772, 1994 WL 374424 (D. Pa. May 26, 1994) (Pennsylvania charged
that three competing hospitals combining to manage the provision of
health care would result in an anti-competitive concentration of market
power);
Puerto Rico v. Wal-mart Puerto Rico, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 395, 409
(D.P.R. 2002) (Puerto Rico sued to obtain a preliminary injunction to
enjoin a retail chain from buying a chain of grocery stores);
Rhode Island v. Neptune Int'l Corp., Civil Action No. 80-4503, 1980
WL 4688 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1980) (Rhode Island sued a
manufacturer-wholesaler and retailer of furniture products for price-
fixing and implementing exclusive dealing and refusal to deal
agreements);
Loftis v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 604 S.E.2d 714, 715 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2004) (South Carolina instituted an UTPA (consumer
protection) action against SCE&G for routinely overcharging
municipal franchise fees to a portion of its population);
South Dakota v. Cent. Lumber Co., 123 N.W. 504, 506 (S.D. 1909),
aff'd, 226 U.S. 157 (1912) (South Dakota sued a lumber company for
criminal and civil antitrust violations by forming a combination to
restrain trade);
Loyola Consumer Law Review
As the parentheticals in the footnote specify, many of these cases are
local and involve local activity such as groceries, dairies,
construction firms, and a varied list of manufacturers and retailers.
The majority of the litigations assert claims for price-fixing and bid-
rigging, but include other antitrust claims such as tying,
monopolization, and exclusive dealing.
D. States Work Together with Federal Antitrust Enforcers
Even when states are not the lead or first-named plaintiff,
states' participation adds value to the litigation, contributing to a
more complete analysis. States help build a case by adding their
knowledge of the local markets and familiarity with the local
geography, help navigate through state agency and regulatory
Tennessee v. Joe Stewart Body Shop, 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,748 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (Tennessee sued auto body repair shop for
attempting to fix the prices of repair services);
Texas v. Zeneca, Inc., No. 3-7 CV 1526-D, 1997 WL 570975, at *1
(N.D. Tex. June 27, 1997) (Texas led a multistate case against a
pesticide manufacturer for conspiring with its distributors to fix resale
prices);
Utah v. Univ. of Utah, 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,550 (D. Utah
1994) (Utah sued a state university hospital for exchanging wage
information with other health care facilities concerning compensation
paid to nurses, fixing prospective compensation, and discouraging
others from negotiating with other third-party payers);
Vermont v. Densmore Brick Co., Inc., Civil Action File No. 78-297,
1980 WL 1846, at *1 (D. Vt. Apr. 10, 1980) (Vermont brought a state
parens patriae action against a manufacturer of wood burning stoves for
price-fixing);
Virginia v. Buckley Moss, Inc., Civil Action No. G-8998-2, 1983 WL
14948, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1983) (Virginia sued a seller of
decorative artwork for price-fixing the resale prices of its dealers);
Washington v. Larson, No. 39916-1-I, 1998 WL 141935 (Wash. Ct.
App. Mar. 30, 1998) (Washington sued two pharmacy owners for price-
fixing the prices that would be paid by insurers, third-party payers, or
consumers for drugs);
West Virginia v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 875 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. W.
Va. 1994) (Action against two dairies alleging conspiracy to illegally
and artificially raise price of milk supplied to school boards);
Wisconsin v. Marigold Foods, Inc., 1980 WL 4676, at *1-2 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 3, 1980) (Wisconsin sued a milk products firm for resale
price-fixing selected dairy products).
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overlays as in banking, health care, and insurance markets, and act as
local counsel for their federal counterparts.
28
From the perspective of the state, committing resources to a
joint investigation is eminently reasonable. The marginal benefit is
often worth the marginal cost. Within the investigation or litigation,
the state can push to accomplish state goals. Attorneys general can
bring specific attorney general tools to bear for the investigation or
litigation as a whole, including subpoena power and the right to seek
civil penalties, disgorgement, and other remedies. 
129
At the same time, a state's interest need not be protected only
through joint action. Harm to the interests protected by the state can
still occur if no other enforcer takes action. The federal antitrust laws
give the attorney general the right to vindicate those interests.
130
Deciding whether to take action can involve probing whether the
harm to those represented by the state can be "fixed," even if the
transaction restrains, benefits, or is neutral in the rest of the
country.13 1 If parties refuse to "fix" the state's concern, that might
illustrate that the transaction or restraint may be more about harming
those represented by the state, as opposed to securing national or
other benefits.
132
When acting with others, states often focus on the rights of
consumers, including the right to recover damage. States' parens
patriae authority is the superior means of securing relief, particularly
when returning monetary relief to consumers. States have gained
much experience and have the tools to return money directly to
consumers. In In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litigation,133 for example, the states were instrumental in
providing consumers with cash, while the FTC obtained injunctive
relief.13 4 In 1996, the attorneys general of several states began an
128 Calkins, supra note 2, at 679-84; ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 147-
49.
129 See generally Robert Hubbard, Non-Antitrust Offenses You Should Know:
Remedies Pursued by State Attorneys General, Civil RICO Committee Program,
ABA Antitrust Section spring meeting Apr. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/civilrico.pdf.
130 See supra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
131 Constantine, supra note 40, at 180.
132 id.
133 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, MDL
No. 1361, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12663 (D. Me. July 9, 2003).
134 In re Sony Entm't, Inc., 2000 FTC LEXIS 95, at *10-12 (F.T.C. Aug. 30,
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investigation into whether distributors and retailers were illegally
conspiring to stabilize or inflate or the prices of prerecorded music
products through the adoption and implementation of Minimum
Advertised Price ("MAP") policies.'35 The FTC initiated a parallel
investigation and obtained consent decrees against the distributor
defendants in 2000.136 The states filed a complaint alleging that
retailers and distributors conspired to fix the price of compact discs in
violation of federal and state antitrust laws. 37 The case settled and
the states recovered cash payments of $67.4 million dollars, as well
as $75.7 million dollars worth of compact discs.' 38
States generally are better at getting consumers recovery than
the competitive alternatives. The FTC's disgorgement remedy is used
sparingly in antitrust matters.' 39 The U.S. Department of Justice does
not seek to get money to consumers injured by antitrust violations. 140
Federal enforcers simply do not-and probably should not-focus
primarily on the monetary claims of consumers. When interacting
with private counsel, states have pushed for greater consideration of
consumers' interests. In the pharmaceutical cases representing end
users, states have focused on consumers' interests, while class
counsel focus on interests of third party payers. 141 In the vitamins
antitrust litigation case,14  class counsel and twenty-four states
2000).
135 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, 216
F.R.D. 197, 200 (D. Me. June 13, 2003).
136 Sony Entm't, Inc., 2000 FTC LEXIS 95 at *10-12.
137 Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, 216 F.R.D.
at 201.
138 Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12663 at *5-6.
139 Calkins, supra note 2, at 693.
140 The Department of Justice arguably is entitled to a monetary remedy for
consumers similar to the FTC's right to seek disgorgement in light of its right to
injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 25. Some cases endorse restitution or similar
remedies for the victims of a violation if pursued by enforcers entitled to secure
injunctive relief. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1946);
United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1951); Mitchell v. De Mario
Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960); S.E.C. v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 712-14 (6th
Cir. 1985).
141 See supra note 90 and cases cited therein.
142 See supra note 25 and cases cited therein. See also supra note 2. Spencer
Weber Waller, Symposium: Private Law, Punishment, and Disgorgement: The
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represented indirect purchasers, including states and consumers, and
recovered $335 million dollars. 143
Finally, any discussion of state enforcement from the
perspective of the Antitrust Modernization Commission requires
consideration of the litigation against Microsoft.' 44 Much of the
commentary on state antitrust enforcement discusses the states' role
in the monopolization litigation against Microsoft. 45 Nonetheless,
the litigation against Microsoft has generated commentary well
beyond the relatively insular world of antitrust enforcement. Thomas
Friedman has identified the litigation against Microsoft as illustrating
the fundamental strength of our economy, in which even the most
powerful and rich corporation can be required by poorly paid
government enforcers to comply with the antitrust laws. 4 6 The
critics, on the other hand, decry any antitrust action "involving the
Incoherence of Punishment In Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 221-25 (2003).
143 Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of
International Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 718-19 (2001). The first
fifty pages of the Master Settlement Agreement in the Vitamins Antitrust Litigation
for indirect purchasers is available at
http://www.abanet.orglantitrust/committees/state-antitrust/vitaminsl.pdf. The other
four parts of that settlement are available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/vitamins2.pdf;
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/vitamins3.pdf;
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/vitamins4.pdf; and
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/vitamins5.pdf. The
Master Settlement Agreement was filed in state courts throughout the country. The
antitrust litigation pursuing damages against the vitamins cartel also included a
settlement of the federal antitrust claims on behalf of direct purchasers. In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 255 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2002) (plaintiffs in
this action represented all persons or entities who directly purchased the vitamins
and choline chloride from defendant vitamin manufacturers such as feed mills,
premix blenders, distributors, and brokers).
'44 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(The U.S. Dept. of Justice and nineteen states sued Microsoft alleging violations of
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for unlawfully maintaining its monopoly in Intel-
compatible personal computing operating systems and attempting to monopolize
the web browser market.).
145 DeBow, supra note 1, at 267; First, supra note 2, at 1032-34; Richard A.
Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys
General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 9-10, 15 n.9 (2004); Calkins, supra note 2, at
676.
146 Thomas L. Friedman, THE LExuS AND THE OLIVE TREE, 357-58 (Farrar,
Straus, & Giroux 2000).
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most valuable company in the U.S. economy.' ' 147 The passions extend
to the work of the Commission-the Washington Post reports that
Commission is sympathetic to antitrust defendants in general and
Microsoft in specific.
4 8
Much of this commentary lacks the broader perspective of the
antitrust litigation against Microsoft. That broader perspective
illustrates that the commentary focuses primarily on Microsoft being
sued, not on the specifics of the antitrust claims. The federal antitrust
monopolization investigation began in the Federal Trade Commission
in 1990 and was transferred to the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department, when the FTC reached a 2-2 deadlock and
suspended the investigation. 149 The first governmental antitrust
litigation focused on Microsoft's acquisition of Quicken, which was
resolved by consent decree. The district court judge, Stanley Sporkin,
rejected the consent decree. 150 The Antitrust Division appealed, the
Court of Appeals reversed, and instructed that a different judge be
assigned on remand, concluding that a "reasonable observer [would]
question whether Judge Sporkin" could be unbiased. 
151
The next round involved the monopolization claims. The
states joined the Antitrust Division in investigating and prosecuting
Microsoft. The cooperation and coordination among the government
enforcers was detailed and long-standing, through trial and appeal.1
52
Microsoft was found by an en banc Washington D.C. Court of
Appeals to have violated the antitrust laws and the new judge,
Penfield Jackson, was also disqualified for the remand on
remedies. 153 After a change of administration in Washington, the
147 DeBow, supra note 1, at 267.
148 Jonathan Krim, A Less Public Path to Changes in Antitrust, WASH. POST,
May 12, 2005, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/1 1/AR2005051102087.html.
149 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Microsoft I].
150 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995)
[hereinafter Microsoft II].
151 See generally Microsoft I.
152 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter
Microsoft III].
153 See generally Microsoft III. Microsoft appealed the District Court's finding
of liability under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the various remedies.
Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 45-46. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's judgment that Microsoft
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Antitrust Division and nine states (the "Settling States") reached a
settlement with Microsoft. Nine states and D.C. rejected that
settlement (the "Litigating States") and pursued a remedies trial.
Those Litigating States got less relief than they sought, most accepted
that determination, West Virginia appealed and then settled, and
Massachusetts pursued the appeal to decision.154 The Court of
Appeals and the district court both clearly held that Massachusetts
was entitled to have its views heard. 155 Both the Settling States and
the Litigating States monitor the resolution with Microsoft, regularly
reporting to District Judge Coleen Kollar-Kotelly. At the same, the
European Commission investigated and is taking action against
Microsoft.
The list of government employees who have been in the
cross-hairs for criticizing Microsoft is stunning. The antitrust
enforcers include the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, twenty states, nine litigating states, two
appealing states, and the European Commission. We are aware of
only one other instance in which a federal judge was disqualified in
an antitrust prosecution brought by a government enforcer.
Amazingly enough, Microsoft succeeded in disqualifying two.
In the broad scheme of things, the effort to ensure that
Microsoft complies with the antitrust laws has been a monumental
undertaking. We are proud that the states have tried to do their part.
V. Conclusion
States have enhanced consumer choice and fostered
competition in small and large markets through investigation,
litigation, and resolution of many antitrust matters. States have also
furthered antitrust jurisprudence through litigation on both the state
and federal levels. The litigation record could not be clearer as to the
importance of state enforcement of the antitrust laws in our federalist
system.
violated § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 46.
154 Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
155 We note that now that Massachusetts has been heard (and its arguments
rejected)-the criticism of state enforcement appears to have subsided and critics
now focus on the actions in Europe taken against Microsoft.
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